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Abstract. Problems with securing IP Telephony systems, insufficient standardization 
and lack of security mechanisms emerged the need for new approaches and solutions. 
In this paper a new, alternative security architecture for voice-systems is presented. It 
is based on digital watermarking: a new, flexible and powerful technology that is 
increasingly gaining more and more attention. Besides known applications e.g. to 
solve copyright protection problems, we propose to use digital watermarking to se-
cure not only transmitted audio but also signaling protocol that IP Telephony is based 
on. 
1   Motivation: IP Telephony security problems 
Most people think that main problems with IP Telephony are connected with pro-
viding Quality of Service (QoS) parameters. This is only part true. Security considera-
tions are very important too. This does not only mean security of conversation be-
tween two communicating parties but also security of signaling messages used to 
make this call possible. Both those problems can be responsible for increasing latency. 
If it’s level rises to a certain value, it can be the most degenerating constrain for IP 
Telephony quality of call. So, now we are always facing necessity of trade off between 
providing security and low latency. 
IP Telephony security problems can be divided into three groups: 
- Security of a signaling protocol on which such a system is based on, 
- Security of the data stream (audio); for IP Telephony there are often RTP 
packets, 
- Security connected with IP environment and networks based on this network 
protocol. 
 
We would like to emphasize that it is not enough to protect the media stream that is 
exchanged between calling parties. Such a thinking leads to situation in which two 
entities are able to talk to each other in a secure manner but they are unable to initiate 
a call because of an attacker actions on the signaling protocol. In [8], [9] and [10] 
different security issues and gaps for VoIP are presented.  
Signaling protocols like SIP and H.323 are often called a “heart” of Voice over 
Internet Protocol because they are responsible for every aspect of the future call and 
even for network architecture. Without proper security of the IP Telephony signaling 
protocols we cannot have a secure voice communication system. Classical architecture 
for existing IP Telephony signaling protocols defines a set of security mechanisms 
which we can be generally divided into two groups: internal (mechanisms defined 
especially for this signaling protocol) and external (mechanisms like IPSec or TLS). 
Combination of these mechanisms is supposed to provide us security. But this is not 
all so simple and we try to discuss this situation below. 
To sum up our motivation section we try to find another way to handle IP Teleph-
ony security based on the following facts: 
- There are drawbacks of SRTP protocol which are discussed in [3]; SRTP is 
the most popular mechanism to provide authentication and integrity for data 
stream, 
- There is no “one size fits all” solution for protecting audio and signaling 
messages [8] for IP Telephony systems. To properly protect such systems we 
must consider a lot of aspects and posses a certain level of IT knowledge, 
- Current security mechanisms for signaling protocols do not quite “fit” for se-
curing real-time services like VoIP [8], 
- Current security mechanisms can cause a situation in which certain network 
equipment on the communication path that do not support those mechanisms 
can break down the connection, 
- There are no standardized security solutions for interworking between differ-
ent signaling protocols, e.g. SIP and H.323, 
- Security mechanisms for signaling protocols are often not implemented by 
vendors because they are increasing the cost of the network equipment (more 
processing time is needed), 
- Standards (e.g. for SIP or H.323) define security mechanisms but often they 
are only optional to implement and vendors take full advantage of it. 
 
That’s why in this paper we are proposing a different approach to the security, 
based on digital watermarking. It is suitable to protect audio content and (or) signaling 
messages. 
2   Introduction: Digital Watermarking 
Digital watermarking is a multidisciplinary field deployed widely in last decade. It 
covers a large field of different aspect (from cryptography to signal processing) and is 
suitable for marking digital content. For our purposes the most interesting feature of 
watermarking is the ability to create a hidden channel in which we can exchange secu-
rity information. Moreover this embed information is imperceptible to third party. In 
this context, watermarking scheme consist of the following stages, which are shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 Figure 1 General watermarking scheme with information embedding 
 
Watermark that will be used in our security architecture must posses few important 
properties like robustness, security, transparency, complexity, capacity and verifica-
tion. All those parameters are well defined in [1] and [2]. Their optimization for real-
time audio system is crucial although they are often mutually competitive so there is 
always a compromise necessary. Not every watermarking technique is applicable for 
our solution. IP Telephony is a real-time service that is why we need watermarking 
schemes that really work for real-time conversations. Such algorithms are described in 
[2], [3] and [5].  
Our security architecture is watermarking scheme independent: whatever algorithm 
for real-time communication is used we assume that an output watermark that it cre-
ated has the best properties that are allowed in this certain environment. In this way 
we gain flexibility of our solution and we can support future ideas and digital water-
marking schemes. 
3   New security architecture proposal 
The most important security services for IP Telephony are: authentication, integ-
rity and confidentiality. First two can be provided with use of watermarking tech-
niques. The third should be guaranteed in different manner e.g. with a use of security 
mechanisms from classical architecture. 
Making a call in IP Telephony systems consist of two phases: signaling phase in 
which certain signaling messages are exchanged between parties and conversation 
phase. Each phase has it’s own, disjunctive set of security mechanisms. Nowadays, 
e.g. in SIP and H.323 we have different security mechanisms designated for securing 
data stream (audio) and different that cover signaling protocol security. Moreover the 
security architecture for SIP and H.323 is also different, which means that they use 
almost disjunctive set of security mechanisms. We are witnessing situation in which 
signaling and audio is secured with different mechanisms, so they are consuming a lot 
of processing time and can be devastating for conversation quality. 
What we are proposing here is to move providing security of signaling messages 
from first phase to second (conversation phase). That’s why we named this method a 
post factum method. Checking security of the signaling protocol is made after the 
signaling phase is finished. It has some disadvantages – most serious is that potential 
attack on signaling protocol is detected after some time during a conversation. But on 
the other hand this approach has certain advantages: 
- it provides one a unified solution for audio and signaling protocol security, 
- it is signaling protocol independent solution, 
- it prevents doubling latency and excessive consuming of processing time, 
- it reduces complexity (and cost!) of network equipment on the communica-
tion path, 
- it can help to solve security mechanisms interworking problems between IP 
Telephony systems based on different signaling protocols, 
- it can also help to protect audio and signaling protocol when interworking be-
tween VoIP systems and PSTN, 
- unlike the existing security mechanisms, it provides real end-to-end security.  
 
From the arguments above we conclude that this solution can be beneficial for IP 
Telephony security and can improve it’s security architecture. 
3.1   Modification of existing digital watermarking scheme 
To make our proposition works, we need to modify watermarking system shown in 
Fig. 1. We add a new functional block called Preprocessing Stage (PPS). It will be 
responsible for preparing data before watermark embedding stage. Modified scheme 
with this new block is shown on the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 2 Modified watermarking scheme 
 
In this system we provide as input to PPS block a signaling message and a sample 
of original voice. After the digital watermark is embedded and sent, in the receiver the 
information is retrieved and verified.  
It is also important how much information we can embed into the original voice 
data. It defines a capacity parameter of digital watermark. This influences the speed of 
authentication and integrity process. In [2] different watermarking schemes developed 
at the Fraunhofer IPSI and the Fraunhofer IIS were considered. In our solution we 
need a very robust watermark to be sure that we can compare and verify sent informa-
tion successfully. The result of the test in [2] shows that simultaneous large capacity 
and robustness depends on the scale of the codec compression. When the compression 
rate is high (1:53) the watermark is robust only when we embed about 1 bit/s . With 
lower compression rate we can obtain about 30 bit/s and the highest data rate was 48 
bit/s with good robust, transparent and complexity parameters.  
A speed of authentication and integrity process in our solution is expected to be 
high but it is not crucial. With low compression rates we propose to add pre-
conversation stage. In this stage there will be few second of RTP packets exchange 
without conversation. It will delay the setup of the call but then during the conversa-
tion the time of verification will be shorter.  
 
Now we will present in greater details how the Preprocessing Stage block is built. It 
consists of functional blocks shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 Preprocessing stage block 
 
As we see in the picture this solution can be suitable for voice and(or) signaling 
messages protection. This gives us flexibility – we can choose if we want to secure 
signaling protocol, voice or both. 
 
The blocks presented in the picture have the following functions: 
SB (Signaling Message Buffer): stores signaling messages from the first phase of 
the call. 
SP (Signaling Processing): in this block hash function is performed on each signal-
ing message. 
RNG (Randomizer): we use it to provide unique data for watermark even if the rest 
of information provided will be again the same (e.g. all signaling messages were veri-
fied so we use last sent). 
WD (Watermarking Data): in this block input data are concatenated with obligatory 
R parameter and optional parameters: IDx (unique, global identifier of one side of the 
connection), TS (time stamp), PASS (shared password known to both sides of conver-
sation). 
 
This block is optional. It must be used if we want to provide integrity and authenti-
cation of both voice and signaling protocol: 
VFE (Voice Feature Extractor): provides characteristic features of the original 
voice that we want to protect. 
3.2   How the new security architecture works 
The general idea of the new proposal is to compare received tokens with appropri-
ate one, locally calculated. Fig. 4 shows how the algorithm works (if A wants to talk to 
B) for securing signaling messages only. It is only to simplify presentation of the solu-
tion. Securing voice is analogous. 
We assume that in signaling phase some signaling messages were exchanged and 
now in the second phase they will be verified. SMS or SMR means Signaling Message 
Sent/Received. H means hash function and W is the embedding digital watermark into 
audio. 
 
 
Figure 4 Algorithm for securing signaling messages 
 
If we want to take a full advantage from this solution and provide security of the 
voice the tokens changes adequately: 
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Where VFS and VFR means Voice Feature Sent/Received. 
 
We see that securing process depends on exchanging security tokens that are calcu-
lated as shown in the Fig. 4. Then in the receiver tokens are compared with locally 
calculated and if they are equal a LoT (Level of Trust) parameter is increased. In any 
other situation LoT value decreases. For called party B the algorithm of handling the 
LoT parameter works as described below in a pseudo-code: 
START 
/* CL – Critical Level, LoT – Level of Trust, T – timer */ 
CL = a; LoTA = x; TA = 0; /* Initiating values */ 
StartTimer(TA); 
FOR (i = 0; i++; i< End of Transmission)  
/* i – Time slot */ 
{ 
IF (TokenABi = TokenBAi) THEN  
   { 
   LoTA ++; 
   ResetTimer(TA); 
   } 
   ELSE (LoTA --); 
IF (LoTA <= CL) OR (TA > k) THEN STOP; (1) 
IF (LoTA = a*x) THEN LoT = x;  (2) 
} 
 
We can see that breaking of the call will happen if the value of LoT parameter is 
equal or below given threshold (CL value) or if the timer TA expires (1). If the com-
munication continues and every signaling message that was sent is verified embedding 
of the digital watermark do not stop. It is a continuous process: to calculate informa-
tion to send after all signaling messages were verified we take last signaling message. 
The LoT value changes during the conversation time and if every signaling message 
was successfully verified the LoT value is rising. To prevent it’s increasing to infinity 
we lower it after it reaches a value of critical level multiply by start value of LoT (2). 
To sum up when we will be embedding tokens to secure signaling messages and(or) 
voice transmission process will be as in a Fig. 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 General transmission process 
4   Conclusion and future work 
In this paper new security architecture based on digital watermarking is proposed. 
It is totally new approach for securing signaling protocol’s messages that are ex-
changed between calling parties. We named it a post factum method because it works 
some time after the phase of exchanging of signaling messages took place. Neverthe-
less we find it very useful and flexible because this scheme is signaling protocol inde-
pendent and potentially gives new possibilities for securing IP Telephony. 
This solution has most advantages when we combine securing of signaling protocol 
and original voice. In this situation we can use one method to provide authentication 
and integrity for conversation and signaling messages simultaneously. This is espe-
cially important when in IP Telephony network multi-signaling protocols are used. 
Future activities will be connected with comparison of latency and complexity for 
IP Telephony systems when using classical security architecture and our watermark 
based one. For example we can compare security mechanisms designated for SIP: SIP 
Digest or for H.323: Procedure I with our solution. Both mechanisms (SIP Digest and 
Procedure I) provide only authentication and integrity security services (without con-
fidentiality) so they are the same security services as provided by our method. 
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